EXHIBIT C

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 2 TOPEKA, KANSAS ORIGINAL 3 4 WESTAR ENERGY, INC. Case No. In Re: 03-4032-JAR ERISA LITIGATION 5 6 TRANSCRIPT OF FAIRNESS HEARING 7 PROCEEDINGS had before the Honorable 8 Julie A. Robinson, United States District Court Judge, for the District of Kansas, 9 Topeka, Kansas, on the 27th day of July, 2006. 10 APPEARANCES: 11 Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq. For the Plaintiffs: SCHIFFRIN & BARROWAY, LLP 12 280 King of Prussia Road Radnor, PA 19087 13 Ronald P. Pope, Esq. 14 Ralston, Pope & Diehl, LLC 2913 S.W. Maupin Lane 15 Topeka, KS 66614 16 For Defendant Sharon Katz, Esq. Antoinette Ellison, Esq. 17 Westar Energy: DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL 18 450 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017 19 Jason M. Hans, Esq. 20 ROUSE HENDRICKS GERMAN MAY PC One Petticoat Lane Building 21 1010 Walnut Street Suite 400 22 Kansas City, MO 64106 23 For Defendant Stanley M. Burgess, Esq. ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP - KC Koupal: 24 2345 Grand Boulevard 25 Suite 2000

> SHERRY A. BERNER Official Court Reporter

Kansas City, MO

64108-2617

For Defendant Kathryn A. Lewis, Esq. WARDEN TRIPLETT GRIER PA Terrill: 9401 Indian Creek Parkway Suite 1100 Overland Park, KS 66210 Court Reporter: Sherry A. Berner, C.S.R.

> SHERRY A. BERNER Official Court Reporter

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	THE COURT: All right. We will call
3	In Re: Westar Energy, Inc. ERISA Litigation,
4	case number 03-4032. Your appearances.
5	We'll begin with you, Ms. Lewis,
6	you're on the phone.
7	MS. LEWIS: Yes. It's Kathryn Lewis
8	for Defendant Richard Terrill.
9	THE COURT: All right. And other
10	appearances, please.
11	MR. MELTZER: Good afternoon, Your
12	Honor. Joseph Meltzer of Schiffrin &
13	Barroway on behalf of the plaintiffs. Joined
14	with me is cocounsel, Ron Pope.
15	MS. KATZ: And Sharon Katz of Davis
16	Polk & Wardwell, and my colleague, Antoinette
17	Ellison, from Davis Polk & Wardwell, for
18	Westar Energy. And Mr. Hans on
19	MR. HANS: Jason Hans on behalf of
20	Westar Energy.
21	THE COURT: All right.
22	MR. BURGESS: I'm Matthew Burgess
23	from Armstrong Teasdale on behalf of Carl
24	Koupal.
25	THE COURT: All right. And we're

here for the fairness hearing on the settlement of the class action in this case.

On May 15th of this year I held a preliminary settlement hearing and preliminarily approved the settlement, ordered that notice be given, as set forth in the order preliminarily approving settlement. And in preliminarily approving the settlement I conditionally certified the class, preliminarily approved the terms of the settlement, and set this date for today's hearing, and, of course, approved the class notice of proposed settlement.

You all have now submitted a proposed order and final judgment. And in addition we've received the motion of the plaintiffs for final approval; a memorandum in support of class counsel's motion for award of attorneys' fees, expenses, and case contribution compensation as well; a declaration of Mr. Meltzer in support of the motions for settlement and awarded fees, compensation, and reimbursement of expenses; a declaration of Mr. Pope concerning that as well.

1 All right. Mr. Meltzer or Ms. Katz, 2 who is going to proceed? MR. MELTZER: I will, Your Honor. 3 4 THE COURT: All right, go ahead. MR. MELTZER: Thank you. Your 5 Honor, we are pleased to be here today. 6 7 as you stated, we're here to present a settlement of all claims in the Westar ERISA 8 9 litigation. As Your Honor has alluded to, a 10 lot of papers have been filed in our presentation so I won't cover everything in 11 12 those papers or it would drag on far too 13 long; but I think I'll hit the relevant 14 points. 15 As I stated, we have a settlement of all claims in the Westar ERISA case. 16 17 was -- the settlement was the product of some rather strenuous and extensive negotiations 18 between the parties. We're proud to present 19 the settlement. We think in light of the 20 21 litigation risk and the damage analogies in this case that it's an excellent result for 22 the ERISA class. 23

of 9.25 million that will be paid by the

The settlement calls for a payment

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defendants into the Westar Energy 401(k) savings plan. That money will then be distributed to class members and plan participants in accordance with the plan of obligation that we've submitted in conjunction with the settlement.

Two points I would want to make quickly. First, the settlement has been reviewed by an independent fiduciary. independent fiduciary was retained by Westar in its corporate capacity and as a fiduciary of the plan. The independent fiduciary in this case is Independent Fiduciary Services, Incorporated. Essentially what they do is they come in to look and see that the settlement meets the DOL class exemption, and also that it's not a prohibited transaction under Section 406 of ERISA. Essentially, they need to make a determination that the release given in consideration for the value of the settlement is fair and that the fiduciaries were not engaged in self-dealing.

They have authorized the settlement.

Your Honor has, obviously, the ultimate

discretion to approve. But in a case such as

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this it's usually a good sign when the independent fiduciary gives its blessing to the settlement.

The other point I would make is that there have been no objections to either the motion for approval or for the application of fees. That's especially telling in this case because we have a -- as Mr. Pope would tell you -- a very active, interested class. They were very involved, very engaged in this entire process. And they have unanimously endorsed the settlement, and no one has lodged any objections to any of the motions pending today.

The two motions that are on calendar for today, as Your Honor stated, are a motion for final approval of settlement, certification of the settlement class and approval of the plan of allocation; and a second motion for an award of attorneys' fees, reimbursement of expenses and case contribution compensation. And, Your Honor, with your permission, I can address the settlement first.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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8 MR. MELTZER: The -- Your Honor, would it be helpful if I gave a background of the claims and the history of the litigation? That's set forth at length in the papers, but I would be happy to do it for the record. THE COURT: No. I think you can summarize that. MR. MELTZER: Okay. Your Honor, just briefly, the first case in the Westar ERISA litigation was filed in March of 2003. The central claim is that the plan

fiduciaries breached their duties under ERISA by allowing investments in the company stock at a time when they knew or should have known that those investments were imprudent.

There were many cases that were filed after the Toledo case, the first case filed in March. There were several cases filed afterwards.

Your Honor consolidated those cases in September of 2003. We filed a consolidated pleading -- which is the operative complaint for today -- in October of 2003, and that touched off a flurry of briefings, several motions to dismiss,

consolidated response, numerous replies.

Your Honor, we started informal settlement negotiations in the summer of 2004. We continued those through the fall to essentially pick a mediator. Our first mediation -- there wound up being four total -- was in December of 2004 with Gary McGowan, who presided over each and every mediation in this case.

Unable to resolve the case, we went back into litigation posture in 2005. We essentially engaged in a formal discovery protocol at that point that was presided over by Magistrate Judge O'Hara. The defendants produced a large volume of documents. We prepared, we analyzed, and coded some of those documents. We set up an electronic database for further analysis.

We also continued on a settlement track, fortunately, as we were going through formal discovery. We had another mediation -- excuse me -- in the spring of 2005 that was, obviously, unsuccessful. We pressed forward with a lot of discovery in the case.

We had yet another mediation in

October of 2005. And while we weren't able to resolve the case at that time, it did break some of the log jam, frankly. There was a fair amount of progress in October of 2005. That may partly be the result of Your Honor's ruling in September of 2005 on the motions to dismiss. Gave people a better sense of what the claims were going to be in this litigation.

We scheduled a final mediation for January 31st of this year. We were able to reach an agreement at that time. We signed the term sheet on that day and began the settlement process which leads us to today's hearing.

In terms of the approval process, the Tenth Circuit has established a four-factor test to determine whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The test is set forth in the Tenth Circuit case Jones v. Nuclear Pharmacy.

I'll go through them briefly. The first factor is whether the proposed settlement was fairly and honestly negotiated. Your Honor, as I just explained,

there were multiple mediations. There were formal negotiations with an experienced mediator. There were informal negotiations. The negotiation process in this case was arms-length, to say the least, and was strenuous and was fair and honest.

The second factor is whether serious questions of law and facts exist, placing the ultimate outcome of the litigation in doubt.

Your Honor, as a lot of courts have noted, these are difficult cases. ERISA itself is a very difficult statute. There are complex questions. And when you factor in the class certification aspects of this case, you find a way to make an ERISA case even more complicated. So I think that factor also militates in favor of approval.

The third factor is whether the value of an immediate recovery outweighs the mere possibility of future relief after protracted and expensive litigation. Your Honor, in this particular case, given what our prospects were for success, even if we overcame every legal hurdle by very capable opposing counsel, I'm not sure that we would

have done any better; and we may have wound up getting a little bit less for the class settlement. This factor is particularly in favor of approval here because we were able to get a recovery which may well exceed what we would have gotten even if we would have won through judgment.

The fourth factor is the judgement of the parties that the settlement is fair and reasonable. I think everyone here today will essentially endorse the settlement as fair and reasonable. I know I do. I'm fairly confident that my colleagues on the defense side will as well. And I think those four factors are what the Tenth Circuit views in terms of assessing whether a settlement should be approved. I think they're all met here.

The only other point that I would make with respect to the settlement, Your Honor, again, is that there have been no objections. So the reaction of the class has been overwhelmingly and unanimously, frankly, in support of approval.

The other aspect of the settlement

approval is for certification of the settlement class. We think that Your Honor mentioned that you preliminarily certified the settlement class. We think that the class certification in this case is very appropriate. A 23(b)(1) class should be certified. The class that we're seeking to certify for settlement purposes is a participant or beneficiary in the Westar Energy employees' 401(k) savings plan from July 1st, '98, through January 1st, 2003, whose account included investments in Westar stock.

Your Honor, as our papers explain in some length, I think all the factors of 23(a) are met, as well as the factors of 23(b)(1) have also been satisfied. There have been a number of these cases both in a settlement context and in a litigation context, this ERISA employer stock type of case. I believe they have all been certified under 23(b)(1) as a non opt-out class. And we think that's appropriate here.

Your Honor, I don't-- I don't have anything more on the settlement itself unless

1	Your Honor has any questions.
2	THE COURT: I don't believe so.
3	Would anyone else like to weigh in
4	on this matter?
5	MS. KATZ: If I might just for a
6	second, Your Honor, just to say on behalf of
7	Westar that we are very pleased to be here at
8	what we hope is now the conclusion of the
9	trilogy of civil cases that had originally
LO	been presented to Your Honor, and we are very
L1	pleased with the settlement. We do believe
L2	that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
L3	The settlement negotiations were
14	very, very hard-fought. This was a very,
15	very difficult case for us to resolve. But
16	we are very pleased with the results, and we
17	think that they will be of great benefit to
18	the members of the class, and we just urge
19	that Your Honor approve the settlement as
20	described by Mr. Meltzer and the
21	certification of the class. Thank you.
22	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
23	Anyone else?
24	All right. I'll begin with the
25	matter of the certification of the class.

And, yes, there have been no objections by any single class member to the certification of the class, to the settlement, or to the related matters concerning allowance of fees and expenses and compensation. I did conditionally certify the class at the preliminary hearing. I'll now reiterate my findings that class certification is proper for the class, as defined in the preliminary order.

The requirements of Rule 23(a) are met. The numerosity requirement is met.

This class consists of several thousand potential class members. Joinder is not practicable.

The requirement of commonality is met. There are common issues of fact and law, including whether the defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to the plan and their participants in allowing the maintenance of existing, and the addition of new, investments in the company stock during the proposed class period; issues concerning whether the defendants knew or should have known of problems besieging the company that

negatively affected the prudence of Westar stock as an investment of the plan during the class period.

Other common issues: Whether

defendants were fiduciaries of the plan

and/or the participants; whether defendants

breached their fiduciary duties, if they were

fiduciaries; whether the plans and the

participants were injured by such breaches;

and whether the class is entitled to damages

and injunctive relief.

The requirement of typicality is met in that the claims of the class representatives are typical of the claims of the class as a whole. The plaintiffs in this case and the proposed class are all employees of Westar, a participant of the plan during the class period, and each had part of his or her individual plan investment portfolio invested in Westar stock during the class period.

All of them-- all of the plaintiffs sustained injury during the class period; and all of the plaintiffs bring their claims pursuant to ERISA Sections 409 and 502(a)(2)

for plan-wide relief, so any relief obtained would inure to the plan as a whole and, derivatively, to its participants during the class period.

And the requirement for adequacy of representation is also met. The named plaintiffs and their counsel are adequate representatives of the interests of the class as a whole. I find that plaintiffs have no interest antagonistic to the interests of the absent class members.

Plaintiffs have retained attorneys
that are highly qualified and experienced in
this type of litigation, ERISA breach of
fiduciary class actions, specifically. And
based on all of the pleadings in the entire
record, I find that they have diligently
represented the class before the Court as
well as in negotiations with defendants'
counsel that resulted in this settlement. So
all of the requirements of 23(a) are met.

Also, the requirements of 23(b)(1) are met in that the only remedy available to the plan participants is in fact plan-wide relief, including the restoration of losses

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to the plan. Actions such as this are by law representative actions which, if successful, will cause defendants to be obligated to provide relief applicable to all participants in the plan.

And given the unique group based relief offered under ERISA for violations of the fiduciary duties owed to participants in covered benefit plans, these actions are appropriate for class treatment under Rule 23(b)(1) to avoid the risk of inconsistent outcomes and inconsistent standards of conduct for defendants; as well as, the prosecution of separate individual actions would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other class members who were not parties to the action.

Thus, I will certify the proposed class pursuant to Rule 23 for settlement purposes. The class being defined as set out in the pleadings. In short: Any person who was a participant in or beneficiary of the Westar 401(k) employees' savings plan from July 1, 1998, through January 1, 2003, and whose account in the plan included

investments in the Westar Energy, Inc. company stock fund.

Excluded from the settlement class are all defendants named in the action, their subsidiaries and affiliates, members of their immediate family, the legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns of any excluded person, as well as any entity in which the company has or has had a controlling interest.

All right. And then turning to the proposed settlement itself, first of all,
I'll find that notice to prospective class
members was adequate. I approved the proposed class notice of proposed settlement at the last hearing.

The administrator filed an affidavit on July 17, 2006, establishing that notice was mailed to the class, as ordered, and it was also published in accordance with the terms of the preliminary order. Notice was sent to 3,871 current and former participants, of the plan on May 26, 2006, and the approved publication notice was published nationally in USA Today and locally in The Kansas City

Star, The Wichita Eagle, and The Topeka

Capital-Journal. Also, plaintiffs created a

dedicated settlement website, which is

identified in the pleadings.

The form and method of notice was agreed to by the parties; it was approved by the Court; it was effectuated by the plaintiffs, consistent with the order; and it satisfies all due process considerations and meets the requirements of 23(e)(1)(B).

All right. Turning to final approval of the settlement, as Mr. Meltzer has indicated, under the Tenth Circuit prevailing case law there are four factors the Court must address and consider when determining whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

The first such factor is that the settlement was fairly and honestly negotiated. As the pleadings set out in detail, and as Mr. Meltzer summarized, this settlement is the product of lengthy litigation as well as mediation and negotiation: 18 months or more of formal and informal negotiations; multiple mediation

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sessions with an experienced mediator, who was also the mediator in the Westar securities litigation; voluminous discovery; as well as intense advocacy and litigation through this stage of motions to dismiss and responses to that.

In addition, the Court finds that class counsel had an in-depth understanding of the merits of plaintiffs' claims and the defenses available to defendants. Plaintiffs counsel had the same. The Court-- in addition, of course, there was this oversight or independent evaluation by a third party experienced in this type of litigation. So based on all of these things, the Court concludes that the settlement was fairly and honestly negotiated.

The second factor is that there be existence of serious questions of law and fact. This is obviously evident to the Court based on having reviewed and considered and ruling on a number of issues that arose in the context of the motions to dismiss.

In addition, more generally, as plaintiffs point out, ERISA is a developing

and esoteric area of the law. It does present many difficult issues of law and fact made more complex, of course, in the context of a class action such as this one. Although plaintiffs survived defendants' motions to dismiss, by and large, defendants would likely have raised serious defenses at the summary judgment phase as well as at trial, if the case proceeded that far. Many of these issues were legally and factually complex issues that militate in favor of settlement.

Also, of course, this case had yet to be certified as a class action, and plaintiffs and defendants, obviously, recognize that courts have not uniformly certified a proposed class to all claims in ERISA cases of this nature.

Also, the risks of establishing damages are always complex and generally recognized in the context of these types of actions. Very complex and require the completion of full discovery and evaluation of the relevant time period by the Court.

And there were questions as to

whether the losses alleged by plaintiffs could be compensated under ERISA. There were questions as to the proper measure of damages. All of which, again, militated in favor of settlement.

Had this case gone to trial, likely there would have been a battle of experts.

Would be difficult for the parties to anticipate the outcome or the decision that would be made after hearing expert testimony from both sides.

A third factor is the value of immediate recovery. The Tenth Circuit has held that the value of immediate recovery is simply the monetary worth of the settlement. This settlement is for \$9.25 million. And the Court agrees that this amount may well have been in excess of what the class may have obtained even through trial. This recovery is in addition to the payment the plan will receive from the recovery garnered in the securities litigation and substantially increases the recovery for the individual class members.

It is -- it is clear that continued

litigation would have been protracted, complex, and expensive; requiring more discovery; requiring the battle over class certification; requiring hiring and vetting and discovery of experts; and ultimately, of course, the expenses and time associated if this case went all the way to trial.

And then the final factor the Court must look at is the judgment of the parties that the settlement is fair and reasonable.

And I've heard from both parties that after -- as Ms. Katz said -- protracted mediation and negotiation and intense negotiation advocacy, they are satisfied that the settlement is fair and reasonable to all.

Both parties are represented by nationally-known counsel with extensive experience in ERISA class actions. This has been vetted by a third party. It's been mediated. The Court is convinced that the settlement is fair and reasonable. Thus, the settlement will be approved at this hearing on final approval of settlement.

And now we'll turn to the motion for award of fees, expenses, and contribution of

compensation to class members.

MR. MELTZER: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, we put in an application for award of attorneys' fees, reimbursement of expenses and case contribution compensation. Our request is for 30 percent of the settlement fund. That amounts to 2.775 million, plus reimbursement of expenses of \$76,715.59, and a \$1,000 award for each named plaintiff for their contribution to this case.

With respect to the request for fees, there is a-- again, there's a test that the Tenth Circuit employs to determine whether-- whether the request is reasonable. That-- that test is set out, among others, in Brown v. Phillips Petroleum. This test is quite a bit longer than the test relating to approval of the settlement so I'll try and run through the factors as quickly as I can. There are, I believe, 10 or so that apply here.

First is the time and labor required. As the application states, Your Honor, the class counsel has spent over 4,000

hours in prosecuting this case. It was a case that was heavily litigated both on the litigation side as well as on the mediation settlement front.

The lodestar in the case is a little bit over \$1.4 million. That translates into a multiplier, a lodestar multiplier, of 1.88. I would submit that that is a very modest multiplier. In comparison, Your Honor, I believe in the Westar securities case the 30 percent awarded by Your Honor, I believe that amounted to something like a 3.9 multiplier. So here it is far, far less.

The second factor is the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented by the case. As we've stated in this hearing before, ERISA is a difficult case-- ERISA is a difficult statute to prosecute a case.

There are a lot of trapdoors in ERISA. The legal questions that get presented in a case like this are complex. They are novel and they are developing. And unless you practice in it, it is a very difficult area of the law to navigate correctly.

The third factor is somewhat related

to that -- the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly. Again, ERISA cases are not easy. When you build in a class action component to them, they go from complicated to extremely complicated.

It is difficult to present the case properly both in pleadings as well as in what were essentially summary trials during all of these mediations. Getting a damage analysis that's credible and gives you a, you know, hope for recovery is not easy. Navigating the statute and the legal issues that are compounded by difficult issues of fact, again, is not an easy proposition.

The fourth factor, the preclusion of other employment by the attorneys due to acceptance of the case. As I stated previously, we dedicated 4,000-- over 4,000 hours. That obviously has an opportunity cost that prevents us or precludes us from working on other matters during the two-plus years or almost three years of litigation that we dedicated here. I retract that.

Three-plus years of litigation here.

The -- whether the fee is fixed or

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contingent is another factor. Here, there was no quarantee that we would receive payment for anything. I believe that is particularly telling here because with Your Honor's ruling on the motion to dismiss and in a developing area of the law, there's no certainty that you're going to overcome the initial Rule 12 challenge. Did not come until September of 2005, several years into the litigation, after we had expended a lot of time and a lot of money in prosecuting these claims. So there was a great deal of uncertainty, and there was certainly a fairly large risk that we were going to get no payment whatsoever.

The next factor is the amount involved and the results obtained. Your Honor, it's a settlement for \$9.25 million. I believe it does substantially increase recovery to the class members. It is in addition to the recovery that the plan will make as part of the Westar securities case. I believe it is an excellent result. And I believe that factor also supports the requested fee.

The next factor is the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys. My firm and -- my firm is an experienced -- Schiffrin & Barroway is an experienced class action firm. Mr. Pope and his firm, Ralston, Pope & Diehl, are very experienced litigators, especially in this particular court. We-- I'll leave the rest of it to the papers so that I don't stand up and sort of trumpet my success and abilities.

The next factor is the undesirability of the case. Your Honor, it's not a difficult leap to say that an ERISA class action to many practitioners would be viewed as undesirable. Sometimes my wife feels the same way. The desirability is-frankly, when cases are easy and not so complex, they become a lot easier to jump into and dedicate your time and resources to. But where they are difficult and complex, as here, it becomes a little more of a-- a little more of a challenge. And, frankly, I think that factor supports the requested fee as well.

Awards in similar cases. When you

look at what the multiplier is in this case,

I think it compares extremely favorably to

both awards in the Tenth Circuit in class

action cases -- I think that's a very modest

multiplier, the 1.88 -- as well as cases

across the country. I think you'll see

multipliers that are closer to three, four,

and five for this type of case. So I think

the requested fee compares very favorably.

The final point, Your Honor, is we have no objections to the award of the fees to the class, as unanimously endorsed in our application.

expenses. We have expended \$76,715.59. We submitted an application to detail the categories of expense. A lot of that is discovery related. Much of-- some of that is travel. It's travel related. There are also copying expenses and the like. I think the expenses, given the length of the case and the complexity of the case, were minimal, fortunately, because we were able to resolve the case before we got further into expert discovery. So resolving the case before we

went into really a deposition protocol and before we started submitting summary judgment papers helped keep expenses to a relative minimum.

The final component of the application is for case contribution awards. We've asked for \$1,000 apiece. That is a low amount relative to what awards have been in other cases. But essentially it recognizes that there are quite a few named plaintiffs. In fact, more in this case than in almost any other that I've seen. But the one thing I will say for the named plaintiffs is they were very active. They played a big role. They were a large part of us being able to hold the line in settlement negotiations. I think they did a really excellent job and served the rest of the class very well.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. MELTZER: If you have any questions, I'll be happy to address them.

THE COURT: I don't.

Anyone else?

All right. The so-called <u>Johnson</u> factors that have been-- come from a Fifth

Circuit case but have been adopted in the Tenth Circuit are those as outlined by Mr. Meltzer. In the Tenth Circuit the percentage-of-recovery method has been endorsed as an appropriate method for determining an award of attorneys' fees in these types of cases and in other types of cases as well.

Based on the entire record, and particularly the parties' pleadings concerning these fees and expenses, I find that the fees requested are reasonable. The expenses are also reasonable and customary. And the compensation requested for the members, the named plaintiffs, is also reasonable.

Many of these factors have already been addressed in summarizing the propriety of the settlement that was approved. But I'll note further that there was extensive time and labor involved in this case. Over 4,000 combined hours in prosecuting the case that culminated in the settlement.

As already addressed, the questions legally and factually were novel and

difficult and complex.

Class counsel is experienced, nationally recognized in this field, and had the requisite skill necessary to perform the legal services required in cases as complex as this.

Based on the number of hours spent over the last three-plus years, it's clear that other employment was precluded to a large degree by the attorneys that represented the class.

The 30 percent request is in keeping with the range of reasonable fee awards or fee awards that have been found reasonable in the Tenth Circuit. And the multiplication factor as well.

The-- as I've already addressed, the \$9.25 million settlement is very favorable to the class. Given the complexity of the legal and factual issues, the need for protracted and intense advocacy, it's fair to say that this case would have been viewed as undesirable, perhaps, to many. And that factor needs to be taken into account.

The nature and length of the

professional relationship with the client is evident, given the length of time that has been spent to date on this case taking it through settlement.

Again, the 33 percent-- or, rather, the 30 percent requested is in line with the range of awards in similar cases in this circuit, including the range of awards given by this particular Court.

As far as the expenses, we've reviewed those. They appear to be reasonable and customary expenses associated with discovery and litigation and mediation.

And finally, with respect to the request for \$1,000 each as a case contribution award to each of the 27 named plaintiffs, I'll find that that is also reasonable and appropriate, given the litigation support that they provided over the last three-plus years to class counsel to the benefit of all other members of the class.

So the motion for award of attorneys' fees, reimbursement of expenses and case contribution compensation is

granted.

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You all had, I think, presented a proposed order. I think my law clerk talked to you about some language that needed to be changed. And as soon as you can get that—— I suppose we could change that, if need be, and we can get this order out right away.

I do commend all of you. I know that you -- I know this was a difficult case for everyone involved. And I had some sense of that deciding the motion to dismiss, how difficult many of these-- all of these issues really were. So I do appreciate the obvious, you know, commitment you all made to securing a fair and reasonable settlement that, you know, benefitted the members of the class and benefitted the company. And I know it took a lot of work and a lot of intense lawyering. And you all, obviously, did a very excellent job in all respects. So I commend you. it's nice to have lawyers such as yourselves appear in this court. I look forward to seeing you again someday in another complex class action, no doubt.

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. MELTZER:

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THE COURT: All right. We'll be in
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           recess.
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                            (THEREUPON, the hearing
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           concluded).
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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
2) ss: DISTRICT OF KANSAS)
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4	CERTIFICATE
5	•
6	I, Sherry A. Berner, Certified Shorthand
7	Reporter in and for the State of Kansas, do
8	hereby certify that I was present at and
9	reported in machine shorthand the proceedings
10	had the 27th day of July, 2006, in the
11	above-mentioned court; that the foregoing
12	transcript is a true, correct, and complete
13	transcript of the requested proceedings.
14	I further certify that I am not attorney
15	for, nor employed by, nor related to any of
16	the parties or attorneys in this action, nor
17	financially interested in the action.
18	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set
19	my hand and official seal at Topeka, Kansas,
20	this _2 ^{NO} day of
21	
22	Sherry A. Berner
23	Certified Shorthand Reporter
24	
25	